We give new proofs for the hardness amplification of efficiently samplable predicates and of weakly verifiable puzzles which generalize to new settings. More concretely, in the first part of the paper, we give a new proof of Yao's XOR-Lemma that additionally applies to related theorems in the cryptographic setting. Our proof seems simpler than previous ones, yet immediately generalizes to statements similar in spirit such as the extraction lemma used to obtain pseudo-random generators from one-way functions [Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin, Luby, SIAM J. on Comp. 1999].
Introduction
In this paper, we study two scenarios of hardness amplification. In the first scenario, one is given a predicate P (x), which is somewhat hard to compute given x. More concretely: Pr[A(x) = P (x)] ≤ 1 − δ 2 for any A in some given complexity class, where typically δ is not too close to 1 but at least polynomially big (say, 1 poly(n) < δ < 1 − 1 poly(n) ). One then aims to find a predicate which is even harder to compute.
In the second scenario, one is given a computational search problem, specified by some relation R(x, y). One then assumes that no algorithm of a certain complexity satisfies Pr[(x, A(x)) ∈ R] > 1 − δ, and again, is interested in finding relations which are even harder to satisfy. It is sometimes the case that R may only be efficiently computable given some side information generated while sampling x. Such problems are called "weakly verifiable puzzles".
Our aim is to give proofs for theorems in both scenarios which are both simple and versatile. In particular, we will see that our proofs are applicable in the interactive setting, where they give stronger results than those previously known.
Predicates
Overview and previous work Roughly speaking, Yao's XOR-Lemma [Yao82] states that if a predicate P (x) is somewhat hard to compute, then the k-wise XOR P ⊕k (x 1 , . . . , x k ) := P (x 1 ) ⊕ · · · ⊕ P (x k ) will be even harder to compute. While intuitive, such statements are often somewhat difficult to prove. The first proof of the above appears to be by Levin [Lev87] (see also [GNW95] ). In some cases, even stronger statements are needed: for example, the extraction lemma states that one can even extract several bits out of the concatenation P (x 1 )P (x 2 ) . . . P (x k ), which look pseudorandom to a distinguisher given x 1 , . . . , x k . Proving this statement for tight parameters is considered the technically most difficult step in the original proof that one-way functions imply pseudorandom generators [HILL99] . Excluding this work, the easiest proof available seems to be based on Impagliazzo's hard-core set theorem [Imp95] , more concretely the uniform version of it [Hol05, BHK09] . A proof along those lines is given in [Hol06b, HHR06] . Similar considerations are true for the more efficient proof that one-way functions imply pseudorandom generators given by Haitner et al. [HRV10] .
Contributions of this paper In this paper, we are concerned with statements of a similar nature as (but which generalize beyond) Yao's XOR-Lemma. We give a new theorem, which is much easier to prove than the hard-core set theorem, and which is still sufficient for all the aforementioned applications.
Our main observation can be described in relatively simple terms. In the known proof based on hard-core sets ( [Imp95, Hol05] ), the essential statement is that there is a large set S, such that for x ∈ S it is computationally difficult to predict P (x) with a non-negligible advantage over a random guess. Proving the existence of the set S requires some work (basically, boosting, as shown in [KS99] ). We use the idea that the set S can be made dependent on the circuit which attempts to predict P . The existence of a hard set S for a particular circuit is a much easier fact to show (and occurs as a building block in some proofs of the hard-core theorem). For our idea to go through, S has to be made dependent on some of the inputs to C as well as some other fixed choices. This technique of switching quantifiers resembles a statement in [BSW03] , where Impagliazzo's hard-core set theorem is used to show that in some definitions of pseudo-entropy it is also possible to switch quantifiers.
Besides being technically simpler, making the set S dependent on C has an additional advantage. For example, consider a proof of the XOR Lemma. To get a contradiction, a circuit C is assumed which does well in predicting the XOR, and a circuit D for a single instance is built from C. On input x, D calls C as a subroutine several times, each time "hiding" x as one of the elements of the input. Using our ideas, we can ensure that x is hidden always in the same place i, and even more, the values of the inputs x 1 , . . . , x i−1 are constant and independent of x. This property, which we call non-rewinding, is useful in the case one wants to amplify the hardness of interactive protocols.
We remark that in this paper we are not concerned with efficiency of XOR-Lemmas in the sense of derandomizing them (as in, e.g., [IW97, IJK06, IJKW08] ).
Weakly Verifiable Puzzles
Overview and Previous Work The notion of weakly verifiable puzzles was introduced by Canetti et al. [CHS05] . A weakly verifiable puzzle consists of a sampling method, which produces an instance x together with a circuit Γ(y), checking solutions. The task is, given x but not necessarily Γ, to find a string y for which Γ(y) = 1. One-way functions are an example: Γ(y) just outputs 1 if f (y) = x (since Γ depends on the instance it can contain x). However, weakly verifiable puzzles are more general, since Γ is not given at the time y has to be found. Canetti et al. show that if no efficient algorithm finds solutions with probability higher than δ, then any efficient algorithm finds k solutions simultaneously with probability at most δ k + ǫ, for some negligible ǫ. This result was strengthened by [IJK09] , showing that requiring some δ ′ > δ + 1/ poly(n) fraction of correct answers already makes efficient algorithms fail, if k is large enough. Independently of the current work, Jutla [Jut10] improved their bound to make it match the standard Chernoff bound. A different strengthening was given in [HR08] , where it was noted that the algorithm in [CHS05] has an additional property which implies that it can be applied in an interactive cryptographic setting, also they studied how much easier solving a weakly verifiable puzzle becomes if one simply asks for a single correct solution from k given puzzles. Also independently of our work, Chung et al. [CLLY09] give a proof for the threshold case (similar to Jutla) which is also applicable in an interactive setting; however, their parameters are somewhat weaker than the ones given by most other papers. Finally, [DIJK09] gives yet another strengthening: they allow a weakly verifiable puzzle to have multiple solutions indexed by some element q, and the adversary is allowed to interactively obtain some of them. They then study under what conditions the hardness is amplified in this setting.
Contributions of this paper
In this work, we present a theorem which unifies and strengthens the results given in [CHS05, HR08, IJK09, Jut10, CLLY09]: assume a monotone function g : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} specifies which subpuzzles need to be solved in order to solve the resulting puzzle (i.e., if c 1 , . . . , c k are bits where c i indicates that a valid solution for puzzle i was found, then g(c 1 , . . . , c k ) = 1 iff this is sufficient to give a valid solution for the overall case.) Our theorem gives a tight bound for any such g (in this sense, previous papers considered only threshold functions for g). Furthermore, as we will see our proof is also applicable in an interactive setting (the proofs given in [IJK09, Jut10] do not have this property). Our proof is heavily inspired by the one given in [CHS05] .
Strengthening Cryptographic Protocols
Overview and Previous Work Consider a cryptographic protocol, such as bit commitment. Suppose that a non-perfect implementation of such a protocol is given, which we would like to improve. For example, assume that a cheating receiver can guess the bit committed to with some probability, say 3/5. Furthermore, suppose that a cheating sender can open the commitment in two ways with some probability, say 1/5. Can we use this protocol to get a stronger bit commitment protocol?
Such questions have been studied in various forms both in the information theoretic and  the computational model [DKS99, DFMS04, DNR04, Hol05, HR05, Wul07, HR08] .
However, all of the previous computational work except [HR08] focused on the case where the parties participating in the protocol are at least semi-honest, i.e., they follow the protocol correctly (this is a natural assumption in the case for the work on key agreement [DNR04, Hol05, HR05] , as in this case the participating parties can be assumed to be honest). An exception to this trend was the work by Halevi and Rabin [HR08] , where it was shown that for some protocols, the information theoretic bounds also apply computationally.
The above are results in case where the protocol is repeated sequentially. The case where the protocol is repeated in parallel is more complicated [BIN97, PW07, PV07, HPWP10, Hai09, CL10].
Contributions of this paper We explicitly define "non-rewinding" (which was, however, pointed to in [HR08] ) which helps to provide a sufficient condition for transforming complexity theoretic results into results for cryptographic protocols. Using, the above results, and specifically that the above results are non-rewindable, we show that we can strengthen any protocol in which the security goal is to make a bit one party has unpredictable to the other party, in the case where an information theoretic analogue can be strengthened. We also study interactive weakly verifiable puzzles (as has been done implicitly in [HR08] ), and show that natural ways to amplify the hardness of these work.
We only remark that our proof is applicable to parallel repetition for non-interactive (two-round) protocols (e.g. CAPTCHAs).
Preliminaries
Definition 1. Consider a circuit C which has a tuple of designated input wires labeled y 1 , . . . , y k . An oracle circuit D(·) with calls to C is non-rewinding if there is a fixed i and fixed strings y * 1 to y * i−1 such that for any input y to D, all calls to C use inputs (y * 1 , . . . , y * i−1 , y) on the wires labeled y 1 , . . . , y i . Definition 2. Let C be a circuit which has a block of input wires labeled x. An oracle circuit D which calls C (possibly several times) treats x obliviously if the input x to D is forwarded to C directly, and not used in any other way in D.
We say that an event happens almost surely if it has probability 1 − 2 −n poly(n). We denote by [m] the set {1, . . . , m}. The density of a set S ⊆ {0, 1} n is µ(S) = |S| 2 n . We sometimes identify a set S with its characteristic function S : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}. We often denote a tuple (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) by x (k) .
If a distribution µ over some set is given, we write x ← µ to denote that x is chosen according to µ. We sometimes identify sets with the uniform distribution over them. We let µ δ be the Bernoulli distribution over {0, 1} with parameter δ, i.e., Pr x←µ δ [x = 1] = δ. Furthermore, µ k δ is the distribution over {0, 1} k where each bit is i.i.d. according to µ δ . When two interactive algorithms A and B are given, we will denote by A, B A the output A has in an interaction with B, and by A, B B the output which B has. We sometimes consider probabilities like Pr[ A, B A = A, B B ], in which case the probability is over random coins of A and B (if any), but they are chosen the same on the left and the right hand side.
3 Efficiently Samplable Predicates 3.1 Single Instance
Informal Discussion
Fix a predicate P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} and a circuit C(x, b, r) which takes an arbitrary x ∈ {0, 1} n , a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and some randomness r as input. We may think of C as a circuit which tries to distinguish the case b = P (x) from the case b = 1 − P (x). Our idea is to identify a set S for which we can show the following:
2. C can be used to predict P (x) for a uniform random x correctly with probability close to 1 − 1 2 µ(S) On an informal level, one could say that S explains the hardness of computing P from C's point of view: for elements from S the circuit just behaves as a uniform random guess, on the others it computes (or, more accurately, helps to compute) P . Readers familiar with Impagliazzo's hardcore lemma will notice the similarity: Impagliazzo finds a set which explains the computational difficulty of a predicate for any circuit of a certain size. Thus, in this sense Impagliazzo's theorem is stronger. The advantage of ours is that the proof is technically simpler, and that it can be used in the interactive setting (see Section 3.5) which seemingly comes from the fact that it helps to build non-rewinding proofs.
The Theorem
The following theorem formalizes the above discussion. It will find S by producing a circuit which recognizes it, and also produces a circuit Q which uses C in order to predict P . Theorem 3. Let P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be a computable predicate. There is an algorithm Gen which takes as input a randomized circuit C(x, b, r) and a parameter ǫ, and outputs two deterministic circuits Q and S, both of size size(C) · poly(n, Large Set: S(x, P (x)) recognizes a set S * = {x|S(x, P (x)) = 1} of density at least µ(S * ) ≥ δ.
Indistinguishability: For the above set S * we have
where P ′ (x) := P (x) ⊕ S(x), i.e., P ′ is the predicate which equals P outside S and differs from P within S.
Predictability: Q predicts P well: Pr
Figure 1: Intuition for the proof of Theorem 3. In both pictures, on the vertical axis, the advantage of the circuit in guessing right over a random guess is depicted. The elements are then sorted according to this quantity. The point x * is chosen such that the area of A is slightly smaller than the area of B (as in equation (5)).
Additionally, these algorithms have the following properties:
1. Unless δ = 1 algorithm Q predicts slightly better:
2. If P is efficiently samplable (i.e., pairs (x, P (x)) can be generated in polynomial time), Gen runs in time poly(n, 1 ǫ ). 3. Gen, S, and Q can be implemented with oracle access to C only (i.e., they do not use the description of C).
4. When thought as oracle circuits, S and Q use the oracle C at most O( n ǫ 2 ) times. Also, they both treat x obliviously, and their output only depends on the number of 1's obtained from the oracle calls to C and, in case of S, the input P (x).
Before we give the proof, we would like to mention that the proof uses no new techniques. For example, it is very similar to Lemma 2.4 in [Hol05] , which in turn is implicit in [Lev87, GNW95] (see also Lemma 6.6 and Claim 7 on page 121 in [Hol06b] ). Our main contribution here is to give the statement and to note that it is very powerful.
Proof Overview. We assume that overall C(x, P (x), r) is more often 1 than C(x, 1 − P (x), r). Make S the largest set for which the Indistinguishability property is satisfied as follows: order the elements of {0, 1} n according to ∆ x := Pr r [C(x, P (x), r) = 1]−Pr r [C(x, 1− P (x), r) = 1], and insert them into S sequentially until both Pr x←S,r [C(x, P (x), r) = 1] > Pr x←S,r [C(x, 1 − P (x), r) = 1] and indistinguishability is violated. Then, it only remains to describe Q. For any x / ∈ S note that Pr[C(x, P (x), r) = 1] − Pr[C(x, 1 − P (x), r) = 1] ≥ ǫ, as otherwise x could be added to S. Thus, for those elements P (x) is the bit b for which Pr[C(x, b, r) = 1] is bigger. In this overview we assume that Pr[C(x, b, r) = 1] can be found exactly, so we let Q(x) compute the probabilities for b = 0 and b = 1, and answer accordingly;
, which can always be guaranteed.
we will call this rule the "Majority Rule". Clearly, Q(x) is correct if x / ∈ S, and in order to get "predictability", we only need to argue that Q is not worse than a random guess on S.
Consider now Figure 1 (a), where the elements are ordered according to ∆ x . The areas depicted A and B are roughly equal, which follows by the way we chose S (note that
At this point our problem is that the majority rule will give the incorrect answer for all elements for which ∆ x < 0, and as shown in Figure 1 (b), this can be almost all of S, so that in general the above Q does perform worse than a random guess on S. The solution is to note that it is sufficient to follow the majority rule in case the gap is bigger than ∆ x * . In the full proof we will see that if the gap is small so that −∆ x * ≤ Pr[C(x, 0, r) = 1] − Pr[C(x, 1, r) = 1] ≤ ∆ x * then a randomized decision works: the probability of answering b = 0 is 1 if the gap is −∆ x * , the probability of answering b = 0 is 0 if the gap is ∆ x * . When the gap is in between then the probability of answering b = 0 is linearly interpolated based on the value of the gap. So for example, if the gap is 0, then b = 0 with probability 1 2 . 2 A bit of thought reveals that this is exactly because the areas A and B in Figure 1 are almost equal.
In the full proof, we also show how to sample all quantities accurately enough (which is easy) and how to ensure that S is a set of the right size (which seems to require a small trick because ∆ x as defined above is not computable exactly, and so we actually use a different quantity for ∆ x ). We think that the second is not really required for the applications later, but it simplifies the statement of the above theorem and makes it somewhat more intuitive.
Proof. We describe algorithm Gen. First, obtain an estimate
such that almost surely ∆ is within ǫ/4 of the actual quantity. If |∆| < 3ǫ/4, we can return δ = 1, S = {0, 1} n , and a circuit Q which guesses a uniform random bit. If ∆ < −3ǫ/4 replace C with the circuit which outputs 1 − C in the following argument. Thus, from now on assume ∆ > 3ǫ/4 and that the actual quantity is at least ǫ/2. Sample random strings r 1 , . . . , r m for C, where m = 100n/ǫ 2 , and let C ′ (x, b, i) be the circuit which computes C(x, b, r i ). Using a Chernoff bound, we see that for all x ∈ {0, 1} n
almost surely. Define, for any x,
Because we define ∆ x using C ′ instead of C, we can compute ∆ x exactly for a given x. Now, order the x according to ∆ x : let
where ≤ L is the lexicographic ordering on bitstrings. We can compute x 1 x 2 efficiently given (x 1 , P (x 1 )) and (x 2 , P (x 2 )).
We claim that we can find x * such that almost surely (we assume ǫ > 10 · 2 −n , otherwise we can get the theorem with exhaustive search)
We pick 50n/ǫ candidates, then almost surely one of them satisfies (5) with a safety margin of ǫ/50. For each of those candidates we estimate 1 2 n x x * ∆ x up to an error of ǫ/100, and keep one for which almost surely (5) is satisfied. We let S(x, P (x)) be the circuit which recognizes the set S * := {x|x x * }, estimate δ ′ := |S * |/2 n almost surely within an error of ǫ/1000, and output δ := δ ′ −ǫ/1000. The situation at this moment is illustrated in Figure 1 , and it is clear that the properties "large set" and "indistinguishability" are satisfied.
We next describe Q. On input x, Q calculates (exactly)
where ∆ x * is defined by (4) for the element x * which defines S),
If neither of the previous cases apply, output 1 with probability
). To analyze the success probability of Q, we distinguish two cases. If x / ∈ S, we know that ∆ x ≥ ∆ x * . Therefore, in this case, we get the correct answer with probability 1. If x ∈ S, it is also easy to check that this will give the correct answer with probability max{ 1 2 (1 + ∆x ∆ x * ), 0}, and thus, on average
, using (5). In total, we have probability at least µ(S)( 1 2 + ǫ 40 ) + (1 − µ(S)) of answering correctly. Since µ(S) ≥ δ, this quantity is at least 1 − δ 2 , which implies "predictability". It is possible to make Q deterministic by trying all possible values for the randomness and estimating the probability of it being correct.
In order to get the additional property 1, we first run the above algorithm with input ǫ/3 instead of ǫ. If δ > 1 − 2ǫ/3, we instead output the set containing all elements and return 1 in place of δ. Note that indistinguishability still holds because we only add a fraction of 2ǫ/3 elements to S. If δ ≤ 1 − 2ǫ/3, we enlarge S by at least ǫ/2 and at most 2ǫ/3; this can be done by finding a new candidate for x * as above. We then output the new set and δ ′ := δ + ǫ 2 . The additional properties 2, 3 and 4 follow by inspection of the proof.
Multiple instances

Informal Discussion
We explain our idea on an example: suppose we want to prove Yao's XOR-Lemma. Thus, we are given a predicate P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} which is somewhat hard to compute, i.e., Pr[C (1) (x) = P (x)] < 1 − δ 2 for any circuit C (1) coming from some family of circuits (the superscript (1) should indicate that this is a circuit operating on a single instance). We want to show that any circuit C (⊕k) from a related family predicts P (x 1 ) ⊕ · · · ⊕ P (x k ) from (x 1 , . . . , x k ) correctly with probability very close to 1 2 , and aiming for a contradiction we now assume that a circuit C (⊕k) exists which does significantly better than this is given.
As a first step, we transform
. . , x k ) and outputs 1 if the result equals b 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ b k , otherwise it outputs 0. We see that we would like to show Pr[
Here is the key idea: we apply Theorem 3 sequentially on every position i of C (k) . Done properly, in each position one of the following happens: (a) we can use C (k) to predict P (x) from x with probability at least 1 − δ 2 , or (b) we find a large set S * i such that if x i ∈ S * i , C (k) behaves roughly the same in case b i equals P (x i ) and in case b i is a uniform random bit. If (a) happens at any point we get a contradiction and are done, so consider the case that (b) happens k times. Recall now how C (k) was built from C (⊕k) : it compares the output of C (⊕k) to b 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ b k . If x i lands in the large set for any i we can assume that b i is a random bit (and it is very unlikely that this happens for no i). Then, C (k) outputs 1 exactly if C (⊕k) correctly predicts a uniform random bit which is independent of the input to C (⊕k) . The probability such a prediction is correct is exactly 1 2 , and overall we get that C (⊕k) is correct with probability close to 1 2 . The theorem gives the formal statement for C (k) , we later do the transformation to C (⊕k) as an example.
The Theorem
Fix a predicate P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} and a boolean circuit C (k) (x 1 , b 1 , . . . , x k , b k ). We are interested in the probability that the circuit outputs 1 in the following Experiment 1:
We will claim that there are large sets S * 1 , . . . , S * k with the property that for any x i which falls into S * i , we can set b i to a random bit and the probability of the experiment producing a 1 will not change much. However, we will allow the sets S * i to depend on the x j and b j for j < i; we therefore assume that an algorithm GenS is given which produces such a set on input t i = (x 1 , b 1 , . . . , x i−1 , b i−1 ).
Experiment 2:
for i := 1 to k do
Theorem 4 essentially states the following: assume no small circuit can predict P (x) from x with probability 1 − δ 2 . For any fixed circuit C (k) , any ǫ, and any k there is an algorithm GenS which produces sets S * i with µ(S * i ) ≥ δ and such that the probability that Experiment 1 outputs 1 differs by at most ǫ from the probability that Experiment 2 outputs 1.
Theorem 4. Let P be a computable predicate, k, 1 ǫ ∈ poly(n) parameters. There are two algorithms Gen and GenS as follows: Gen takes as input a randomized circuit C (k) and a parameter ǫ and outputs a deterministic circuit Q of size size(C (k) ) · poly(n) as well as δ ∈ [0, 1]. GenS takes as input a circuit C (k) , a tuple t i , and a parameter ǫ and outputs a deterministic circuit S t i (x, b) of size(C (k) ) · poly(n). After a run of Gen, almost surely the following properties are satisfied:
Large Sets: For any value of t i := (x 1 , b 1 , . . . , x i−1 , b i−1 ) the circuit S t i (x i , P (x i )) recognizes a set S * i := {x i |S(t i , x i , P (x i )) = 1}. The probability that in an execution of Experiment 2 we have µ(S * i ) < δ for any of the S * i which occur is at most ǫ.
Indistinguishability: Using sets S * t i as above
If P is efficiently samplable (i.e., pairs (x, P (x)) can be generated in polynomial time),
Gen and GenS run in time poly(n).
3. Gen, GenS, S t i , and Q can be implemented with oracle access to C only (i.e., they don't use the description of C).
4. When thought of as oracle circuits, S t i and Q use the oracle C at most O( k 2 n ǫ 2 ) times. Also, they both treat x obliviously and are non-rewinding. Finally, their output only depends on the number of 1's obtained from the oracle calls to C and, in case of S t i , the input P (x).
Proof. For any fixed tuple t i = (x 1 , b 1 , . . . , x i−1 , b i−1 ), consider the circuit C t i (x, b, r) which uses r to pick random x j for j > i, and runs C (k) (t i , x, b, x i+1 , P (x i+1 ), . . . , x k , P (x k )). 3 We let GenS be the algorithm which invokes Gen with parameter ǫ 4k from Theorem 3 on the circuit C t i and then returns the circuit recognizing a set from there.
We next describe Gen: For ℓ = nk/ǫ iterations, pick a random i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, use the procedure in Experiment 2 until loop i, and run algorithm Gen from Theorem 3 with parameter ǫ 4k . This yields a parameter δ and a circuit Q. We output the pair (Q, δ) for the smallest δ ever encountered. Since k and ǫ are polynomial in n, almost surely every time Theorem 3 is used the almost surely part happens. Thus, we get the property "predictability" (and in fact the stronger property listed under additionally) immediately. We now argue "large sets": consider the random variable δ when we pick a random i, simulate an execution up to iteration i of Experiment 2, then run Gen from Theorem 3. Let δ * be the ǫ k -quantile of this distribution, i.e., the smallest value such that with probability ǫ k the value of δ is at most δ * . The probability that a value not bigger than δ * is output by Gen is at least 1 − (1 − ǫ k ) ℓ > 1 − 2 −n , in which case "large sets" is satisfied. We show "indistinguishability" with a standard hybrid argument. Consider the Experiment H j :
Random Experiment H j :
Experiment H 0 is equivalent to Experiment 1, Experiment H k is the same as Experiment 2. Applying Theorem 3 we get that for every fixed x 1 , . . . , x j−1 , b 1 , . . . , b j−1 , almost surely
where
j is chosen the same way as b j is chosen in experiment H j (in Theorem 3 the bit is flipped, but when using a uniform bit instead of flipping it the distinguishing probability only gets smaller). Applying the triangle inequality k − 1 times we get that almost surely the difference of the probabilities in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 is at most ǫ 2 . Since "almost surely" means with probabilities 1 − 2 −n poly(n) > 1 − ǫ 2 , we get "indistinguishability". We already showed the additional Property 1. Properties 2,3, and 4 follow by inspection.
Example: Yao's XOR-Lemma
As a first example, we prove Yao's XOR-Lemma from Theorem 4. We will give the proof for the non-uniform model, but in fact it would also work in the uniform model of computation.
Theorem 5 (Yao's XOR-Lemma). Let P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be a predicate, such that for all circuits Q of size at most s:
Then, for all circuits of size s/ poly(n, k,
Proof. Assume a circuit C (⊕k) which contradicts (10) is given, we will obtain a circuit Q which contradicts (9). For this, let C(x 1 , b 1 , . . . , x k , b k ) be the circuit which runs C (⊕k) (x 1 , . . . , x k ) and outputs 1 if the result is the same as b 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ b k . We apply Theorem 4 setting the parameter ǫ to ǫ ′ /2, which produces (among other things) a parameter δ. We assume that the 3 properties which almost surely hold do hold (otherwise run Gen again). In case δ < δ ′ , we use Q to get a contradiction. Otherwise, we get
≤ Pr[C outputs 1 in Experiment 2 and all sets S * i were of density at least δ] + ǫ ′ (13)
Example: Extraction Lemma ([HILL99])
Roughly speaking, the construction of a pseudorandom generator from an arbitrary oneway function proceeds in two steps (see [Hol06a] for a more detailed description of this view). First, using the Goldreich-Levin theorem [GL89] , one constructs a pseudo-entropy pair 4 (f, P ), which is a pair of functions f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} poly(n) , P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} such that for all efficiently computable A,
for some non-negligible δ ′ , and which satisfies some additional information theoretic property (the information theoretic property ensures that predicting P (x) from f (x) is a computational problem, and (15) does not already hold because f is, say, a constant function). Second, given independently sampled instances x 1 , . . . , x k , the extraction lemma then says that extracting (δ ′ − 1 n )k bits from the concatenation P (x 1 ) . . . P (x k ) will give a string which is computationally indistinguishable from a random string. Due to the information theoretic property above, once one has the extraction lemma, it is relatively easy to get a pseudo-random generator. In the following we will prove this extraction lemma.
A technicality: the predicate which is hard to predict in this case is supposed to have input f (x) and output P (x). However, in reality this does not have to be a predicate: f is not always injective (in fact, for f obtained as above it will not be). Most works avoid this problem by now stating that previous theorems also hold for randomized predicates. This is often true, but some of the statements get very subtle if one does it this way, and statements which involve sets of "hard" inputs very much so. We therefore choose to solve the problem in a different way. We consider circuits which try to predict P (x) from x, but are limited in that they first are required to apply f on x and not use x anywhere else. Now, we have a predicate again, but it can only be difficult for this restricted class. However, since the oracle circuit Q in Theorem 4 treats x obliviously we stay within this class.
Lemma 6 (Extraction Lemma, implicit in [HILL99] ). Let (f, P ) be a pair of functions satisfying (15) for any polynomial time machine A and set k = 1/n 3 . Let Ext(m, s) be a strong extractor which extracts m = (δ ′ − 1 n )k bits from any k-bit source with min-entropy (δ ′ − 1 2n )k such that the resulting bits have statistical distance at most 2 −n from uniform. Then, for any polynomial time A
is negligible.
Proof. Assume otherwise, and let ǫ(n) be inverse polynomial and infinitely often smaller than the distinguishing advantage of A. We consider the circuit C (k) (x 1 , b 1 , . . . , x k , b k ) which first applies f on every x i , then pick s at random, computes z := Ext(b 1 , . . . , b k , s), and executes A(f (x 1 ), . . . , f (x k ), s, z). We apply Theorem 4 on C using parameter ǫ 2 , which produces, among other things, a parameter δ. Consider first the case δ < δ ′ − 1 4n . Then, there is a circuit Q which predicts P (x) from x and uses x obliviously in C. This implies that the resulting circuit evaluates f (x) for any input x and ignores the input otherwise; we can therefore strip off this evaluation, and get a circuit which contradicts (15). In case δ ≥ δ ′ − 1 4n , we run Experiment 2. If all sets which occur in the experiment are of size at least δ (and this happens with probability at least 1 − ǫ/2), then we can use a Chernoff-Bound to see that with probability 1 − 2 −Ω(n) , at least (δ − 1 4n )k ≥ (δ ′ − 1 2n )k of the x i land in their respective set S * t . Thus, in this case the extractor will produces a z which is 2 −Ω(n) -close to uniform and the indistinguishability property of Theorem 4 implies that (16) is negligible.
Cryptographic Protocols which output single bits
Again we start with an example: consider a slightly weak bit commitment protocol, where the receiver can guess the bit the sender committed to with probability 1 − δ 2 . In such a case, we might want to strengthen the scheme. For example, in order to commit to a single bit b, we could ask the sender to first commit to two random bits r 1 and r 2 , and then send b ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 to the receiver. The hope is that the receiver has to guess both r 1 and r 2 correctly in order to find b, and so the protocol should be more secure.
In the case where the protocol has some defect that sometimes allows a sender to cheat, we might also want to consider the protocol where the sender commits twice to b, or, alternatively, that he commits to r 1 , then to r 2 , and sends both b ⊕ r 1 and b ⊕ r 2 to the receiver. In this case, one can hope that a cheating receiver still needs to break the protocol at least once, and that the security should not degrade too much.
Just how will the security change? We want to consider a scenario in which the security is information theoretic. We can do this by assuming that instead of the weak protocol, a trusted party distributes a bit X to the sender and some side information Z to the receiver.
The guarantee is that for any f , Pr[f (Z) = X] ≤ 1 − δ 2 . In such a case, one can easily obtain bounds on the security of the above protocols, and the hope is that the same bounds hold in the computational case. The theorem below states that this is indeed true (for protocols where the security consists of hiding single bits).
We remark that while the two aforementioned examples of protocol composition are already handled in [HR08] (their result applies to any direct product and any XOR as above), Theorem 8 handles any information theoretic amplification protocol as long as it can be implemented efficiently.
Definition 7. A pair (X, Z) of random variables over {0, 1} × Z, where Z is any finite set, is δ-hiding if
Theorem 8. Let a cryptographic protocol (which we think of as "weak") W = (A W , B W ) be given in which A W has as input a single bit c. Assume that there is a function δ such that for any polynomial time adversary B * W there is a negligible function ν such that
where the probability is also over the coins of A W and B * W (if any). Let further an information theoretic protocol I = (A I , B I ) be given. In I, A I takes k input bits (X 1 , . . . , X k ) and has a single output bit. Furthermore, assume that I is hiding in the sense that for k independent δ-hiding random variables (X i , Z i ), any (information theoretic) adversary B * I , and for some function η(k):
Let S = (A S , B S ) be the protocol where A and B first execute k(n) copies of W sequentially, where A uses uniform random bits as input. Then, they run a single execution of protocol I. In the execution to I, A uses his k input bits to the weak protocols as input. The output of A in S is the output of A in the execution of I. We also need that (A I , B I ) and k(n) are such that I can be run in time poly(n) for k = k(n).
Then, for any polynomial time B * S there is a negligible function ν ′ such that
Proof. Let x ∈ {0, 1} n be the concatenation of the randomness which A uses in an execution of the protocol W and his input bit c. We let P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be the predicate which outputs c = P (x). In order to obtain a contradiction, we fix an adversary B * S for the protocol S which violates (20). We would like to apply Theorem 4. For this, we define C (k) ( x 1 , b 1 , . . . , x k , b k ) as follows: C (k) first simulates an interaction of B * S with A S , where A S uses randomness x i in the ith invocation of the weak protocol W . After this, B * S is in some state in which it expects an invocation of the information theoretic protocol. C (k) simulates this information theoretic protocol, but it runs A I with inputs b 1 , . . . , b k instead of the actual inputs to the weak protocols. In the end, B * S produces a guess for the output bit of A S , and C (k) outputs 1 if this guess equals the output of A I (b 1 , . . . , b k ) in the simulation.
In Experiment 1 of Theorem 4, b i = P (x i ) is used, and so C (k) exactly simulates an execution of the protocol S. Since we assume that B * S contradicts (20), we see that the probability that C (k) outputs 1 in Experiment 1 is, for infinitely many n and some constant c at least 1 2 + η(k) + n −c . We now apply Theorem 4 on the circuit C (k) with parameter n −c /3. This yields a parameter δ T 4 (the subscript indicates that it is from Theorem 4). We claim that
To see this, we assume otherwise and obtain a contradiction. In Experiment 2, Let Γ i be the communication produced by the weak protocol W in round i. Assuming all sets S * i in the execution are of size at least δ (this happens with probability at least 1 − n −c /3), the tuples (b i , Γ i ) are δ-hiding random variables. Consequently, when the circuit C (k) simulates the information theoretic protocol I using bits b i , it actually simulates it in an instance in which it was designed to be used. Since (19) holds for an arbitrary adversary in this case we get that Pr[C (k) outputs 1 in Experiment 2|No set S * i was of measure less than δ] ≤ 1 2 + η(k). (22) Therefore, the probability that C (k) outputs 1 in Experiment 2 is at most
3 , and using "indistinguishability" the probability that C (k) outputs 1 in Experiment 1 is at most
3 . However, our assumption was that the probability that C (k) outputs 1 is at least 1 2 + η(k) + n −c , and so almost surely Gen does not output such a big δ T 4 , establishing (21).
Theorem 4 also provides us with a non-rewinding circuit Q which treats x obliviously and which satisfies "predictability". We explain how to use Q to break (18), the security property of the weak protocol W .
Since Q(x) is non-rewinding, it uses the input x exclusively in a fixed position i, together with a fixed prefix (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 ), in all calls to C (k) . We first extract i and the prefix.
We now explain a crucial point: how to interact with A W in order to cheat. We simulate the i − 1 interactions of A W with B * S up to and including round i − 1 using (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 ) as the input bit and randomness of A. In round i, we continue with the actual interaction with A W . Here, A W uses randomness x (on which we, however, do not have access).
After this interaction, we need to be able to extract the bit c of A W . For this, we evaluate Q(x), which we claim is possible. Since Q is oblivious and deterministic, the only difficulty is in evaluating the calls to C (k) ( x 1 , b 1 , . . . , x k , b k , r) . All calls use the same values for x 1 , . . . , x i . Recalling how C (k) is defined, we see that we can continue from the state we had after the interaction with A W in order to evaluate C (k) completely (note that all the b i are given, so the we can also evaluate the information theoretic protocol I).
We get from Theorem 4 that Q satisfies, almost surely, infinitely often, using (21)
This therefore gives a contradiction to (18): in order to get rid of the "almost surely", we just consider the algorithm which first runs Gen and then applies the above protocol -this only loses a negligible additive term in the probability.
Weakly Verifiable Puzzles
Interactive Weakly Verifiable Puzzles
Consider a bit commitment protocol, in which a sender commits to a single bit b. In a first phase the sender and the receiver enact in an interactive protocol, after which the sender holds some opening information y, and the receiver has some way of checking whether (y, b) is a valid decommitment. If the protocol is secure, then it is a computationally hard problem for the sender to come up with two strings y 0 and y 1 such that both (y 0 , 0) and (y 1 , 1) are valid decommitments, in addition, he may not even know the function the receiver will use to validate a decommitment pair, 5 and thus in general there is no way for the sender to recognize a valid pair (y 0 , y 1 ). We abstract this situation in the following definition; in it we can say that the solver produces no output because in the security property all efficient algorithms are considered anyhow.
Definition 9. An interactive weakly verifiable puzzle consists of a protocol (P, S) and is given by two interactive algorithms P and S, in which P (the problem poser) produces as output a circuit Γ, and S (the solver) produces no output. The success probability of an interactive algorithm S * in solving a weakly verifiable puzzle (P, S) is:
The puzzle is non-interactive if the protocol consists of P sending a single message to S.
Our definition of a non-interactive weakly verifiable puzzle coincides with the usual one [CHS05] . The security property of an interactive weakly verifiable puzzle is that for any algorithm (or circuit) S * of a restricted class, the success probability of S * is bounded.
An important property is that S * does not get access to Γ. Besides bit commitment above, an example of such a puzzle is a CAPTCHA. In both cases it is not obvious whether a given solution is actually a correct solution.
Strengthening interactive weakly verifiable puzzles
Suppose that g is a monotone boolean function with k bits of input, and (P (1) , S (1) ) is a puzzle. We can consider the following new puzzle (P (g) , S (g) ): the sender and the receiver sequentially create k instances of (P (1) , S (1) ), which yields circuits Γ (1) , . . . , Γ (k) for P . Then P (g) outputs the circuit Γ (g) which computes Γ (g) (y 1 , . . . , y k ) = g(Γ (1) (y 1 ) , . . . , Γ (k) (y k )).
Intuitively, if no algorithm solves a single puzzle (P (1) , S (1) ) with higher probability than δ, the probability that an algorithm solves (P (g) , S (g) ) should not be more than approximately Pr u←µ k δ [g(u) = 1]. (Recall that µ k δ is the distribution on k-bits, where each bit is independent and 1 with probability δ.) The following theorem states exactly this.
Theorem 10. There exists an algorithm Gen(C, g, ǫ, δ, n) which takes as input a circuit C, a monotone function g, and parameters ǫ, δ, n, and produces a circuit D such that the following holds. If C is such that
then, D satisfies almost surely,
Additionally, Gen and D only require oracle access to both g and C, and D is non-rewinding.
and Gen runs in time poly(k, 1 ǫ , n) with oracle calls to C.
The monotone restriction on g in the previous theorem is necessary. For example, consider g(b) = 1 − b. It is possible to satisfy g with probability 1 by producing an incorrect answer, but Pr u←µ δ [g(u) = 1] = 1 − δ.
Proof of Theorem 10
Algorithm Description If k = 1, Gen creates the circuit D which runs C and outputs its answer. Then either g is the identity or a constant function. If g is the identity, the statement is trivial. If g is a constant function, the statement is vacuously true. D is non-rewinding.
In the general case, we need some notation. For b ∈ {0, 1}, let G b denote the set of inputs G b := {b 1 , . . . , b k |g(b, b 2 , . . . , b k ) = 1} (i.e., the first input bit is disregarded and replaced by b). We remark that G 0 ⊆ G 1 due to monotonicity of g. We will commonly denote by u = u 1 u 2 · · · u k ∈ {0, 1} k an element drawn from µ k δ . After a given interaction of C with P (g) , let c = c 1 c 2 · · · c k ∈ {0, 1} k denote the string where c i is the output of Γ (i) on input y i , which is the ith output of C. We denote the randomness used by P (g) in execution i by π i .
For π * , b ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} we now define the surplus S π * ,b . It denotes how much better C performs than "it should", in the case where the randomness of P (g) in the first instance is fixed to π * , and the output of Γ (1) (y 1 ) is ignored (i.e., we don't care whether C solves the first puzzle right), and b is used instead:
where the first probability is also over the interaction between P (g) and C as well as randomness C uses (if any). The algorithm then works as follows: first pick 6k ǫ log(n) candidates π * for the randomness of P (g) in the first position. For each of those, simulate the interaction (P (g) , C) and then get estimates S π * ,0 and S π * ,1 of S π * ,0 and S π * ,1 such that | S π * ,b − S π * ,b | ≤ ǫ 4k almost surely. We consider two cases:
• One of the estimates satisfies S π * ,b ≥ (1 − 3 4k )ǫ. In this case, we fix π 1 := π * and c 1 := b, and invoke Gen(C ′ , g ′ , (1 − 1 k )ǫ, δ, n), using the function g ′ (b 2 , . . . , b k ) = g(c 1 , b 2 , . . . , b k ) and circuit C ′ which is defined as follows: C ′ first (internally) simulates an interaction of P (1) with C, then follows up with an interaction with P (g ′ ) .
• For all estimates S x * ,b < (1 − 3 4k )ǫ. In this case, we output the following circuit D C : in a first phase, use C to interact with P (1) . In the second phase, simulate k − 1 interactions with P (1) and obtain (y 1 , . . . , y k ) = C(x, x 2 , . . . , x k ). For i = 2, . . . , k set c i = Γ i (y i ). If c = (0, c 2 , . . . , c k ) ∈ G 1 \ G 0 , return y 1 , otherwise repeat the second phase 6k ǫ log( 6k ǫ ) times. If all attempts fail, return the special value ⊥ (or an arbitrary answer).
Overview of Correctness
The interesting case is when Gen does not recurse. In this case we know that C has higher success probability than Pr u←µ k δ [g(u) = 1], but for most π * , the surpluses S π * ,0 and S π * ,1 are less than (1 − 1 k )ǫ. Intuitively, then C is correct on the first coordinate unusually often when c ∈ G 1 − G 0 (as this is the only time that being correct on the first coordinate helps). If we could assume that 1) that the algorithm always outputs an answer, and 2) for every π * , the surpluses, S π * ,0 and S π * ,1 are less than (1 − 1 k )ǫ, then the theorem would follow by straight-forward manipulations of probability.
Unfortunately these assumptions are not true, but the proof below shows that because these assumptions only fail slightly, not much is lost. Informally, Equations 30-35 show that if the algorithm fails to output an answer it is either because Pr
is very small (in which case this π * will not contribute much anyhow), or because we are unlucky (which happens with very small probability). Additionally, Equations 37-41 show that because we did not find a π * with large surplus, we can assume that (unless we were very unlucky) there are few π * with large surpluses, which cannot have undue influence.
Analysis of Correctness
Consider first the case that we find (x * , b) for which S x * ,b ≥ (1 − 3 4k )ǫ. We can assume that S x * ,b ≥ (1 − 1 k )ǫ, since the error is at most ǫ/(4k) almost surely. Thus, we satisfy all the requirements to use Gen with k − 1 (using x * as the first input and g(b, ·) as the monotone function with k inputs), which will return a non-rewinding circuit for which
. The remaining properties are easily verified.
The more interesting case is if Gen does not recurse. First, we get, for any puzzle π * = (x * , Γ * ) (simply using (27) and G 0 ⊆ G 1 ):
and thus, still fixing π * and multiplying by Pr
We bound the first summand in (29):
ǫ log(6k/ǫ) none of the elements c was in G 1 − G 0 . In both cases:
≥ Pr
= Pr
Inserting into (29) gives
We bound the second summand of (36). Consider the set W of puzzles for which both S π * ,1 and S π * ,0 are not very large. Formally:
Almost surely, µ(W) ≥ 1− ǫ 6k : otherwise Gen would accept one of the sampled puzzles almost surely and recurse. Thus, we get
We insert into (36) (and then use Pr[g(
This concludes the proof of Theorem 10.
Example: Bit Commitment
Theorems 8 and 10 can be used to show how to strengthen bit commitment protocols. We explain this as an example here. Assume we have given a weak bit protocol, where a cheating receiver can guess a bit after the commitment phase with probability 1 − β 2 , and a cheating sender can change the bit he committed to with probability α. We show that such a protocol can be strengthened if α < β − 1/ poly(n).
We should point out that a different way to prove a similar theorem exists: one can first show that such a weak bit-commitment protocol implies one-way functions (using the techniques of [IL89] ). The long sequence of works [HILL99, Nao91, Rom90, NOV06, HR07] imply that one-way functions are sufficient to build bit commitment protocols (the first two papers will yield statistically binding protocols, the last three statistically hiding protocols). However, this will be less efficient and also seems less natural than the method we use here.
In the following, we first define weak bit commitment protocols. We then recall a Theorem by Valiant [Val84] , and then show how to use it to strengthen bit commitment.
Weak Bit Commitment Protocols
We formalize a "weak" bit commitment protocol between a sender and a receiver by considering algorithms S(b, r S ) and R(r R ), where b is the bit which the sender commits to, and r S and r R are the randomness of the sender and receiver respectively. We denote by Γ(S(b, r S ) ↔ R(r B )) the communication which one obtains by running S(b, r S ) interacting with R(r R ). Also, S(b, r S ) ↔ R(r B ) S denotes the output which S produces in such an interaction, which for an honest S will be used later to verify the commitment. Let S(b, r S ) ↔ R(r B ) R denote the output receiver R produces which can be thought of as a guess of b.
Definition 11. An α-binding β-hiding bit commitment protocol consists of two randomized interactive TM S(b, r S ) and R(r R ), as well as a check-algorithm R C , with the following properties.
Correctness The protocol works if both parties are honest. More concretely, for γ = Γ(S(b, r S ) ↔ R(r R )) and τ = S(b, r S ) ↔ R(r R ) S we have that R C (b, γ, τ ) = 1 with probability 1 − negl(n).
Binding A malicious sender cannot open the commitment in two ways: For any randomized polynomial time machine S * (r S ), setting γ := Γ(S * (r S ) ↔ R(r R )), the probability that S * outputs τ 0 and τ 1 such that R C (0, γ, τ 0 ) = 1 and R C (1, γ, τ 1 ) = 1 is at most α.
Hiding For any randomized polynomial time machine R * , Pr
If a protocol is 1/p(n)-binding and 1−1/p(n) hiding for all polynomial p(·) and all but finitely many n we say that it is a strong bit commitment protocol.
We point out that our notation is chosen such that for a strong bit commitment scheme, α → 0 and β → 1. Given an α-binding β-hiding bit commitment protocol, we would like to use it to get a strong bit commitment protocol. By a simulation technique [DKS99] this is impossible if α ≥ β (there is a simple protocol which achieves this bound for semi-honest parties without any assumption: with probability 1 − α the sender sends his output bit to the receiver, and otherwise neither party sends anything). Our results will show that if α < β − 1/ poly(n) then such a strengthening exists. Previously, such a result was only known for α < β − 1/ polylog(n) [HR08] (if one is restricted to reductions in which the parties can only use the given protocol interactively, and not to build a one-way function).
Monotone Threshold Functions
Given a weak protocol (S, R), we will transform it as follows: the parties will execute (S, R) sequentially k times, where the sender uses random bits as input. Then, they will apply an "extraction protocol", which is made with the following two properties in mind: a party who knows at least 1 − α fraction of the committed bits will know the output bit almost surely; a party who has no information about 1 − β fraction of the input bits will have no information about the output bit almost surely. It turns out that such an extraction process can be modeled as a monotone boolean circuit, where every wire is used in at most one gate (i.e., read-once formulas).
To get such a circuit, we use the following lemma. It can be obtained by the techniques of Valiant [Val84] . Also, it appears in a more disguised form as Lemma 7 in [DKS99] (where it is used for the same task we use it here, but not stated in this language).
Lemma 12 ( [Val84, DKS99] ). Let α, β with α < β − 1/ poly(n) be efficiently computable.
There exists a k ∈ poly(n) and an efficiently computable monotone circuit g(m 1 , . . . , m k ) where every wire is used in at most one gate and such that 
Strengthening Bit Commitment
We come to our result of this section.
Theorem 13. Let (S, R) be an α-binding and β-hiding bit commitment protocol for polynomial time computable functions α and β with α < β − 1/ poly(n). Then, there is an oblivious black-box construction of a bit commitment scheme (S S 0 , R R 0 ).
Proof. Let g be as guaranteed by Lemma 12 for these parameters α, β, and k the input length of g. The players run k instances of (S, R) sequentially, where the sender commits to a uniform random bit c i in instance i. We associate each c i to one of the input wires. The sender then runs the following "extraction protocol", in which he uses additional variables 6 c k+1 , . . . , c 2k−1 . We associate those with the other wires in g. 7 The sender then traverses g as if he were evaluating the circuit. When encountering a gate with input wires i, j, and output wire ℓ, he distinguish two cases. If the gate is an OR gate, set c ℓ = c i ⊕ c j .
If the gate is an AND gate, the sender sets c ℓ to be a completely new random value and sends c ℓ ⊕ c i and c ℓ ⊕ c j to the receiver. Once the sender "evaluated" g in this way, he sends b ⊕ c 2k−1 to the receiver (where b is the input to the sender, and c 2k−1 is the bit associated with the output wire of g).
To open the commitment, the sender sends all the opening information for the individual positions to the receiver. The receiver then checks if the extraction phase was done consistently, and accepts if all these tests succeed and the output matches.
Hiding: We would like to use Theorem 8. For this, it only remains to argue that the extraction protocol is information theoretically secure. For any β-hiding random variables, we define a random variable H over {0, (the point of H is that it is 1 exactly if Z gives no information about X, and furthermore H is often 1). We get random variables H 1 , . . . , H k in this way, and evaluate the circuit g(H 1 , . . . , H k ). One sees per induction that Z 1 , . . . , Z k together with the communication produced gives no information about the bit corresponding to a wire iff the corresponding value when evaluating g(H 1 , . . . , H k ) is one. Since the probability that the output is 1 is 1 − 2 −n , we get the information theoretic security.
Binding: We can interpret the bit commitment protocol as an interactive weakly verifiable puzzle: in the interaction, the receiver is the person posing the puzzle, and the sender is the solver. In order to solve the puzzle, the sender needs to send two valid openings to the receiver.
In order to break the resulting puzzle, the sender needs to solve the subpuzzles in all positions a i for some input for which g(a 1 , . . . , a k ) = 1. Using Theorem 10 for δ = β thus gives the result.
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